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The Yemeni Congregation for Reform
(al-Islâh): The Difficult Process of
Building a Project for Change
Laurent Bonnefoy et Marine Poirier
1 The Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Tajammu‘ al-yamanî lil-islâh), commonly known
as al-Islâh, was established on September 13, 1990, a few months after the unification of
North and South Yemen and the legalization of a multi-party system. It was created at a
time of profound changes in the Yemeni political system, which went from a single-party
system in each of the two Yemens (the General People’s Congress in North Yemen and the
Yemeni Socialist Party in South Yemen) to a political project in a unified Yemen who
regarded itself as openly democratic. Opposition parties were then allowed (except based
on regionalist or sectarian grounds) and within a year, 20 political parties were accounted
for. Partisan and independent press also emerged, elections were organized, and a new
constitution was drafted. Though sudden, the transition was initially rather painless and
free of major violence or protest, even within the two former single parties. 
2 Al-Islâh is  often described as the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.  It  does,
however  encompass  diverse  religious,  ideological  and  sociopolitical  tendencies1.
Members  of  the Muslim Brotherhood are largely  associated with a  traditionalist  and
“tribal” wing (less directly ideological (al-Abdali*, 2007)) as well as with business elites
who do not fit in either category, some of whom with close ties with Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf monarchies2.
3 When it comes to relations between political rulers and Islamists the Yemeni case study
Yemen is quite enlightening. It gives us the opportunity to understand the development
and patterns of mobilization of various movements or parties in an environment that
appears to be only slightly repressive when compared to other countries in the region.
Here, the various Islamist tendencies have been allowed to develop, debate, structure and
position themselves  (on democracy,  multiparty  systems,  foreign policy,  etc.)  without
being directly exposed to state repression. In order to introduce and facilitate an in-depth
The Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Islâh): The Difficult Process of Building a Project for Change
Returning to Political Parties?
1
study of al-Islâh party, the subject of this chapter, we shall begin with some facts on the
original “Yemeni political formula”. 
4 Historically,  the “republican revolution” of  September 26,  1962,  which overthrew the
Zaydi Imamate in North Yemen, only managed to establish itself after eight years of civil
war, following a peace agreement between republicans and royalists. The compromise led
to  a  peculiar balance  of  power,  whose  basic  mechanism has  endured even after  the
unification  of  North  and  South  Yemen,  even  if  subjected  to  various  pressures  and
becoming the reason for contentions. The balance was based primarily on the rejection,
albeit incomplete, of the denominational cleavage between the Zaydis (a Shiite minority
predominantly found in the northern highlands and clearly distinct from the Twelver
Shiites found in Iran) and the Sunni Shafeis. Hence, even within the republican framework
built in opposition to the Zaydi Imamate, all  presidents of North Yemen and later of
unified Yemen were of Zaydi origin. Yet none of them laid direct claims to their identity;
instead they encouraged to look beyond inherited religious identities (Bonnefoy, 2008). 
5 Led by military inspired by Nasserist ideology, the revolutionaries of September 26, 1962
engaged in a long civil war against a royalist stronghold, made up mainly of Zaydis from
the high plateaus of the northwestern region of North Yemen and supported by Saudi
Arabia. Progressively, the violence and determination of the Egyptian-backed military
failed,  and the revolutionary group began to fall  apart.  In December 1994,  historical
figures of the Yemeni Free Movement – including Muhammad al-Zubayrî and Ahmad
Nu‘mân, mayor leaders of the revolution (Douglas, 1987) – denounced the corruption of
the ruling power controlled by Colonel ‘Abd Allâh Sallâl. At the end of 1967, the Royalists
surrounded Sanaa for 70 days and appeared to be in a position to reinstate the Imamate.
At that time, the Republicans had lost the support of the Egyptian army, busy elsewhere
and  defeated  on  the  Israeli  front.  In  order  to  end  the  North  Yemen  deadlock,  a
compromise was drafted that aimed at reintegrating tribes (not just Zaydi tribes) and the
pro-royalist  Zaydi  religious  establishment  more  systematically  into  state  structures.
Beyond  bringing  peace  to  the  country  and  stabilizing  the  republican  regime,  the
compromise led to a purge of some “left-leaning” servicemen and the co-optation of some
royalist political leaders. 
6 For more than 40 years, the foundational compromise of contemporary Yemen’s political
formula  (in  which  former  South  Yemen  has  been  engaged  since  1990)  has  enabled
participation to power of different political forces with various ideological tendencies
(leftwing, republicans, Arab nationalists, traditionalists, the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis)
or multiple identity referents (Zaydism, Sunnism, tribalism). Therefore, regime leaders
have gained recognition by drawing, whether simultaneously or alternately, on various
registers.
7 As early as November 1967,  ‘Abd al-Malik al-Tayyib,  a Muslim Brotherhood leader (a
largely informal and illegal structure at the time), was appointed Minister of Education
and Information of the Yemen Arab Republic. During the 1970s, ‘Abd al-Majîd al-Zindânî,
a  former  companion of  al-Zubayrî  and a  member  of  the  conservative  branch of  the
Muslim Brotherhood. was entrusted with religious education in North Yemen through the
Bureau  of  Orientation  and  Guidance  (Maktab  al-tawjîh  wa  al-irshâd).  In  dire  need  of
educated personnel, the education sector recruited many Egyptian and Sudanese teachers
who were reportedly close to the Brotherhood. Some ended up teaching in the Scientific
Institutes  (al-Ma‘âhid  al-‘ilmiyya),  a  parallel  education  system  financed  through  a
substantial  Saudi  donation.  Though  clearly  controversial,  this  system contributed  to
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moving beyond Zaydi and Chafei religious identities during the second half of the 20th
century and creating a more global identity. Such movement shielded the Yemeni society
from sectarian stigmatization, even if  it  re-emerges every now and then, as with the
Saada War which began in 2004 between the Yemeni army and the Believing Youth (al-
Shabab al-Mu’min), a group professing Zaydi revival led by the al-Hûthî family (Dorlian,
2008). The Yemeni national army also reorganized partially around individuals who were
close to Islamists of various tendencies. In 1982, the General People’s Congress (GPC, al-
Mu’tamar al-sha‘bî al-‘âmm), a partisan structure aiming at uniting all political movements,
was established in North Yemen. At the time, in addition to President ‘Alî ‘Abd Allâh
Sâlih’s autocratic inclination, the GPC also expressed the President’s wish to postpone the
legalization of the multi-party system. 
8 The participation of various political movements exemplifies the capacity of integration
characterizing  the  regime of  the  Yemen Arab  Republic  and  explains  why  the  North
Yemeni society, which constitutes about 80% of the overall population of unified Yemen,
had  not  experienced  any  violent  and  profound  cleavage  between  state  power  and
traditional tribal and religious members on the one hand, and Islamist movements on the
other hand,  until  well  into the 2000s.  Although real,  dissidences such as the guerilla
movement of the National Democratic Front, financed by South Yemen in the 1970s, have
remained essentially  peripheral,  and,  in any case,  have not  led to any massive state
repression. 
9 In his analysis of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, Renaud Detalle declared in 1997
that one of the major stakes in Yemen’s political future was “the Islamists’ emancipation
from state  tutorship.”  Over  ten years  later,  have  Islamists  in  general  and al-Islâh  in
particular managed to free themselves from the power in place? Does the party still
represent a “restrained” (Burgat, 1999, p. 241), “discreet, peaceful and intellectual” (al-
Yamani, 2003, p. 55) opposition, or has it evolved into a real political opposition force
with a plausible project for change? 
10 Our study of al-Islâh deals primarily with the evolution of the party in its Yemeni context.
How are al-Islâh’s strategies, resources and mobilization affected by the context’s changes
due to internal and external factors (increasing monopoly of President Sâlih and the
General  People’s  Congress,  and  “Global  War  on  Terror”)?  How can  al-Islâh’s  destiny,
forever  oscillating  between  pro-power  and  opposition  strategies,  symbolize  the
paradoxes  of  a  political  landscape  that  is  both  “gaining”  pluralism  (through  the
institutionalization of the opposition) and “losing” pluralism (through the ruling power’s
hegemony over resources)? 
11 We shall first examine the impact of political and social structures on al-Islâh. How does
the  party  fit  into  a  landscape  shaped  by  institutions,  political,  social  and  religious
identities, other parties, and ideological debates? How does the cause defended by al-Islâh 
interact with other agendas and identity referents? Subsequently, we shall look into al-
Islâh’s resources and repertoires in an effort to understand, in our final segment, the
strategies aimed at achieving emancipation and building a project for political change. 
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Al-Islâh: A Party Embedded within the Yemeni Context 
Gathering and institutionalization of preexisting movements
12 Ever since it emerged in 1990, al-Islâh party has had little difficulty in representing a
credible political power within the particular framework of the “Yemeni formula” and
the political system in post-unification Yemen. It has been regarded as an alternative
power despite the close relationship between some of its founders and the ruling regime.
For almost two decades, the party has played on this ambiguity, both inside and outside
of the political regime. When they established their party, the leaders were no beginners
in politics; they had long been active in the field: ‘Abd Allâh al-Ahmar, sheikh of the
Hâshid tribal confederation, who chaired al-Islâh until his death in December 2007 had
been, since the 1960s, a key figure in the interaction between the republican power, the
tribal system and Islamism. Al-Ahmar was considered as instrumental in rallying leading
Zaydi tribes from the northern highlands to the republic during the 1960s. When the
General People’s Congress was established in 1982,  he was appointed as a permanent
council member3. Consequently, al-Islâh’s emergence on the political scene in 1990 made
possible the institutionalization of various pre-existing political forces such as, among
others, the Muslim Brotherhood branch, which operated at the time either within the
framework of the ruling General People’s Congress, or in a non-institutional even semi-
clandestine fashion through militias fighting against the socialists in the 1970s and 1980s4
. The various tribal, Islamist and commercial components of al-Islâh seem to have rallied
around symbolic figures such as ‘Abd Allâh al-Ahmar, Muhammad al-Yadûmî and ‘Abd al-
Majîd al-Zindânî, as well as around more political slogans, such as the preservation of
traditional  tribal  and  religious  values,  the  refusal  to  share  power  with  socialists  as
imposed by the unity agreement, or the fight against corruption. The three wings that
make  up  the  party  do  not  systematically  compete  with  one  another;  they  coexist
generally and agree on these issues. Each wing, however, uses different repertoires and
mobilization methods, which may reflect a potential division of political tasks. Hence, the
tribal component is made up of a pool of men and voters who seem to influence the
relation  between  the  ruling  power  and  al-Islâh  more  often  than  not.  The  Islamist
component contributes their ideology and acitivists, whereas the commercial component
contributes their networks and respectability. Less than three years after it was created,
al-Islâh results during the 1993 legislative elections, ranked ehaed of the Yemeni Socialist
Party and second to the General People’s Congress of President ‘Alî ‘Abd Allâh Sâlih5. 
13 Early on, al-Islâh derived much of its legitimacy in North Yemen from the tribal system
prevailing in the highlands (the role of  sheikhs,  the legal  system, the code of  honor
(Dresh, 1993)) and from the historical contribution of Islamist movements throughout the
numerous  founding  stages  of  contemporary  Yemen,  especially  during  the  1962
revolution.  Therefore,  ever  since  it  was  established,  al-Islâh  was  able  to  represent  a
significant political force capable of challenging the ruling party directly. Even though
the republican regime had also  based much of  its  legitimacy on the  mobilization of
traditional groups and symbols, al-Islâh had done it even more systematically and more
ostentatiously. In the former South Yemen areas, the pressure put by state institutions on
traditional (tribal and religious) elites during the socialist period led to a conservative
reaction, after the 1990s unification, reminiscent of the reaction that occurred in the
former Soviet republics of Central Asia (Petric, 2002) at that time. This reaction, in turn,
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encouraged the development of Islamist movements (the Muslim Brotherhood, Sufis in
the province of Hadramout, for instance, or Salafis) on which the party could capitalize
(Mermier, 1997). 
14 Moreover,  the  party’s  official  denomination,  the  Yemeni  Congregation  for  Reform,
directly reflected the integration of the party structure into the debates and references
that  characterized  the  post-unification  political  system in  Yemen.  In  fact,  the  word
“party” implies a negative connotation specific to Yemeni history and associated with
division, corruption, and exclusive allegiances. During the 1980s, the political scene in
contemporary  Yemen was  largely  influenced and dominated by  the  General  People’s
Congress, who broke away – at least formally – from the party structure and their call for
a hizb (party) for the sake of a solidarity that transcends and stigmatizes party divides.
Since the 1980s, the Yemeni Salafi movement led by Muqbil al-Wâdi‘î has brandished a
founding principle based on rejecting hizbiyya (partisanship), i-e partisan structure and
electoral participation (Bonnefoy, 2008). In spite of their relatively marginalized position,
they managed to initiate a debate and stigmatize the very concept of parties. Mistrust of
partisan politics was reinforced by the fact that the socialist period in the South between
1970 and 1990 is frequently referred to as “ayyâm al-hizb” (i.e. the days of the party). In
collective imagination, the word “party” thus refers primarily to the Yemeni Socialist
Party, and the term “tajammu” (congregation) adopted by al-Islâh seems, in effect, much
more positive6. 
15 Al-Islâh also managed to play a  significant  part  in the Yemeni  political  landscape by
capitalizing on the historical role of the Muslim Brotherhood or other reformist groups
close to them (including some of the Free Yemenis led by Muhammad al-Zubayrî) in the
process of building the republican compromise, achieving the goal of bringing together
religious identities and moving beyond primary Zaydi and Chafei identities by recruiting,
ever since the party was created, members of both groups without discrimination. The
Muslim Brotherhood participated directly in the early phase of the process of political
and  social  modernization;  indeed,  as  mentioned  earlier,  the  history  of  the  Muslim
Brotherhood  in  Yemen  did  not  begin  with  the  establishment  of  al-Islâh.  They  were
involved  in  the  first  revolution  attempt  in  1948  when  they  delegated  Algerian
revolutionary Fudhayl al-Wartilâni. In an attempt to lay the foundations of the republican
project, Muhammad al-Zubayrî, described by his companions as a member of the Muslim
Brotherhood7 and later assassinated in 1965, created in 1964 a “Party of God” (Hizb Allâh)
(Burgat,  Camberlin,  2002),  thus  asserting his  conviction  that  religion  was  the  only
referential authority capable of reconciling the republic with a highly conservative rural
society where royalists were recruiting. The “tribal-Islamist” alliance later played a part
in the republican movement and in defending the regime against protest. For example,
many  of  today’s  al-Islâh  leaders,  including  Muslim Brotherhood  member  Muhammad
Qahtân,  were  active  during  the  1970s  in  the  armed  struggle  (then  financed  by  the
government of North Yemen8) against left-wing movements and Arab nationalists, who
were supported by the socialist regime in the South. 
 
An Islamist party?
16 The diversity in the backgrounds of al-Islâh’s leaders, elected representatives, voters and
activists, revealed in the many studies published on the party over the past 15 years,
raises the issue of its ideological structure and its designation as an Islamist party as well.
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Al-Islâh cannot be reduced to the sole offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood. Both rural
and urban, the party is not quite elitist yet not a true mass party; therefore identifying
one typical sociological party member profile seems doomed to failure. Although activists
and leaders have Zaydi and Chafei backgrounds, they are clearly different, on the one
hand, from movements inspired by the Zaydi revival, which began in the 1980s under the
leadership of clerics, such as Majd al-Dîn al-Muayyadî and Badr al-Dîn al-Huthî, and parties,
such as al-Haqq Party, and on the other hand, from Salafi movements who reject political
involvement and systematically stigmatize the Zaydis’ Shiism. Under the dual supervision
of  its  tribal  and Islamist  components  (a  phenomenon described by P.  Dresch and B.
Haykel (1995, p. 410) as “patronage” relations), al-Islâh placed the party directly at the
heart of Yemeni political culture yet made it harder to identify and explain a cause for
the party to defend. As a result, the first electoral victories of al-Islâh candidates in some
districts  were due as much to the strength of  tribal  allegiances and support of  local
notables  as  to  the  recruiting  ability  of  Islamist  ideology.  The  flexibility  of  al-Islâh’s
doctrine and program and its mixed leadership have thus promoted clientelist relations
and partisan “nomadism”. 
17 The case of ‘Abd Allâh al-Ahmar’s sons is a good example of this trend: over the years,
four of his sons were elected to the Parliament, two of them (Hamîd and Madhhaj) on al-
Islâh lists, and the other two (Husayn and Himyar) on the General People’s Congress’ lists;
meanwhile, Sadiq, his oldest son, was appointed to the Majlis al-shûrâ (the Consultative
Council)  as  a  member of  al-Islâh.  Likewise,  several  intellectuals,  including Nâsir  Taha
Mustafâ and Fâris al-Saqqâf, moved from al-Islâh party to the General People’s Congress in
the late 1990s. Indeed, relations between individuals, tribes or regions frequently took
precedence over party loyalties, which were no longer an issue when it came to being
appointed as civil servants, being elected or serving in a commission. While this state of
affairs may have encouraged pluralism, it is challenged today by the obvious monopoly of
the General People’s Congress over resources and its increasing control over institutions
and positions, including low-ranking civil servants and teachers. Accordingly, al-Islâh’s
attempt  to  gain  more  autonomy  –  as  we  shall  see  below  –  may  be  the  result  of  a
decreasing pluralism. Indeed, such attempt exemplifies the limits of a patronage-based
system which tries  to  contain  the  opposition  but  is  no  longer  able  to  satisfy  all  its
potential followers. 
18 While al-Islâh may be labeled as an Islamist party, it does not have a monopoly on the
denomination. On the contrary, it is part of a varied landscape where multiple references
compete, condemn and sometimes overlap and complement one another. These groups
include the Muslim Brotherhood (who represent the ideology-oriented branch of al-Islâh),
“jihadist”  fringes,  Salafis,  Sufis,  and Zaydi  revival  groups.  Each group has  their  own
opinion  on  four  key  issues,  namely  participation  in  partisan  politics,  loyalty  to  the
regime, violent confrontation with the rulers, and stigmatization of other religious and
political identities (Bonnefoy, 2009). 
 
The Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Islâh): The Difficult Process of Building a Project for Change
Returning to Political Parties?
6
Table 1. Summary of the strategies adopted by the various typical Islamist ideals in contemporary
Yemen
Typical
Islamist
ideals
Key  figures
and
organizations
Direct
participation  in
party  politics
and
democratization
process 
Automatic
loyalty  to
the
republican
ruler
Significant
episodes  of
violent
confrontation
with  the
State
Significant
episodes  of
violent
confrontation
and
stigmatization
of  other
religious  and
political
identities
The  Muslim
Brotherhood
al-Islâh Yes No No Yes
“Jihâdist”
fringes
Groups
affiliated
with al-Qaeda
No No Yes Yes
Salafis
Muqbil  al-
Wâdi’î  (died
in 2001)
No Yes No Yes
Sufis
Dar  al-
Mustafa 
No Yes No No 
Zaydi
revival
Al-Haqq
Party;
Husayn  al-
Hûthî (died
in 2004) 
Yes No Yes Yes
19 The strictly “Islamist” field is not al-Islâh’s only competitor; the religious repertoire is
predominantly based on consensus and regularly exploited by partisan groups on the
Yemeni political scene. 
20 The designation of al-Islâh as an Islamist party (in the broad sense of the word, i.e. as a
party whose aim is to “speak the Muslim language” and, as François Burgat says, “resort
in a privileged and sometimes ostentatious manner to a rhetoric  borrowed from the
Muslim culture.”  (Burgat,  2005,  p.  15))  may  also  be  challenged  based  on  the  rather
heterogeneous nature of its leaders and members, on the diversity of positions they hold
(Bonnefoy,  Ibn Sheikh,  2002) and on the regime’s ability to use the same rhetoric in
addition to religious symbols. Nevertheless, the party’s platform, positions, practices and
repertoires  are  largely  consistent  with  Muslim  culture  and  are  clearly  part  of  a
conservative  framework  (defense  of  traditions  and  tribal  values,  distrust  of
modernization often perceived as synonymous with westernization, support for Islamic
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causes); as a result, al-Islâh shares common characteristics with other Islamist parties in
the Middle East and yet, at the same time, it deviates from the dominant rhetoric of the
regime based on the democratization process, economic development and security. For
example, in 1991, al-Islâh activists drew general attention when they criticized Article 3 of
the  new  constitution  which  stipulated  that  the  Sharia  was  the  primary  source  of
legislation rather than the only one, as the Islamists wished. In 1994, following the war
between the ruling regime in the North and the southern secessionists, a constitutional
amendment was adopted and al-Islâh won its case on this controversial issue. 
21 At the same time, it seems that at least some of al-Islâh’s founders refuse to use their
religious  identity  as  a  factor  of  distinction,  division  or  opposition  to  other  political
formations. In 1993, ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Anisî, then-secretary general of al-Islâh, declared:
“We chose to be called the Yemeni Congregation for Reform rather than the Islamic
Congregation, because we do not want to be identified on the basis of Islam. We believe
that the Islamic project in Yemen is not that of a particular group or party, but rather the
project and choice of all constituent groups of the Yemeni people. Yemen is very different
from other Arab and Muslim countries, because Islam here is not a contentious issue: No
political force or party – not even the Yemeni Socialist Party – can claim that they steered
away from Islam9.” Through a fairly consensus-oriented position, al-Islâh has, to a certain
extent,  based its political platform on a principle of integration into decision-making
circles and loyalty to the power in place rather than rupture from them. Therefore, its
position as an opposition member, rekindled during electoral campaigns, and their wish
to project itself as a political alternative, are very ambivalent. 
22 Such refusal to stigmatize the regime based on religion is definitely characteristic of al-
Islâh’s ambiguous position and places the party at the heart of the implicit framework of
the republican compromise. Consequently, since its creation al-Islâh has emerged as both
a full-fledged component of the political system and an objective ally of President ‘Alî
‘Abd Allâh Sâlih’s power. As a result, the image of opposition party fostered by the party
leaders as well as observers may be awkward, and, as we shall see further, the choice of
breaking away and building an alternative option (a position underscored when the party
was created in 1990 and concretely embraced as of 1997), is not very convincing and not
well accepted by everyone in the party. 
23 In this context, the partisan cause endorsed by al-Islâh seems unpredictable or hard to
define.  From a limited point  of  view,  it  may be perceived as  a  means to defend the
interests of some party leaders, including ‘Abd Allâh al-Ahmar until 2007, who have close
relationships  with  the  president  and  are  even  sometimes  patronizing.  Under  the
circumstances, criticism of the regime (largely theoretical through the denunciation of
corruption or the inefficiency of leaders in general) is tolerated only when the access to
that same power by key party figures is not fundamentally challenged. Therefore, we
could say that the development of al-Islâh which was extensive during the 1990s and
rather limited in the past few years,  has actually made it  possible for the regime to
dominate a large part of the opposition and prevent them from playing their role to the
fullest. The illusion of true pluralism was kept up and rulers were spared the full-blown
consequences of an open political game. 
24 A  more  comprehensive  approach  reveals  that  the  party  has  several  programs  and
strategies based on the ideological, social or generational diversity of al-Islâh members,
especially  with reference to  the  role  of  ‘Abd Allâh al-Ahmar’s  sons.  Those  programs
include a compromise with power for the sake of preserving interests and positions10,
The Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Islâh): The Difficult Process of Building a Project for Change
Returning to Political Parties?
8
militant social action and virulent criticism against the very foundations of the regime or
against its alleged corruption in the name of the Muslim Brotherhood’s doctrine11,  as
well as the (often depoliticized) attempts to produce local notabilities as alternatives to
the General People’s Congress’ candidates12. Consequently, the idea whereby al-Islâh is
merely a bogus, fake opposition party is not relevant. Given the inclusive formula of the
Yemeni political system and the characteristics of the republican compromise, al-Islâh’s
emancipation from its various legacies or sponsorships (whether ideological through the
socialists’ stigmatization or social through tribal and political allegiances based on their
alliance with power) can only be understood as a long process.  Al-Islâh definitely has
multiple resources and can achieve self-sufficiency and autonomy from the ruling party
and smooth the way for an openly admitted opposition. 
 
Resources and Mobilization 
25 An analysis of al-Islâh’s resources and mobilization patterns is interesting for a number of
reasons. On the one hand, it sheds light on the particular position of the structure within
the Yemeni political system; that is to say it shows the mobilization of varied resources
within the framework of limited pluralism13. On the other hand, it reveals the relation
between directly  politicized mobilization patterns  (via  Islamist  ideology or  adaptable
protest)  and  other  less  explicitly  political  resources  (sometimes  even  described  as
apolitical)  associated  for  instance,  with  tribal,  economic  or patronage  allegiances.
Obviously, the two types of resources are inextricably linked. However, it seems relevant
to differentiate between the “rental” resources linked to the party’s regional or tribal
allegiances  representing a  support  base  that  can be mobilized beyond the  realms of
ideology or programs, and mobilizations related with the party’s active participation in
the community charities, education and religion, which are more obviously part of other
Islamist parties’ activities elsewhere in the Middle East. 
 
A tribal and economic “rent” based on identities
26 Since the early 1990s,  al-Islâh’s  double Islamist and tribal affiliation has been used to
consolidate the party’s presence on the political and electoral landscape. The “rental”
resources  described  further,  may  seem,  a  priori,  depoliticized  and  non-ideological.
However, they are ambivalent because, by nature, they limit the party’s autonomy. In
fact,  they  give  the  party  a  seemingly  efficient  mobilization  capacity  with  a  quasi-
automatic base of voters, elected representatives and activists and they make possible the
creation of strongholds. However, at the same time, the party’s independence as a whole
becomes contingent on the strategy – sometimes even on the interests – of the figures
who symbolize these resources primarily based on tribal or regional allegiance networks
and on charismas that can be described as traditional and that some al-Islâh leaders rely
on  for  mobilization  purposes  in  certain  areas.  These  “rental”  resources  are  not
necessarily  based on political  projects  or  programs designed to  convince  voters  and
activists; rather, they are linked to the special positions held by some leaders (local or
tribal notability, historical role, wealth from trade, etc.).
27 In addition to the al-Ahmar clan led at first by ‘Abd Allâh, and since late 2007 by Sâdiq,
the Abû Luhûm family led by Sheikh Sinân from the region of Nihm (one of the main
figures  of  the  Bakîl  tribal  confederation)  plays  an  important  role  in  this  particular
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mobilization process. For instance, Târiq Sinân Abû Luhûm is one of the founders of the
Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW, Jam‘iyya lil-islâh al-ijtima‘î al-khayriyya), that is
officially independent from the party but contributes nonetheless to spreading the party’
guiding principles and ensuring part of its popularity. 
28 Such resources have inevitably led to regional disparities, and, since the early 1990s, to
the creation of electoral strongholds, especially in some tribal zones to the north of Sanaa
where the local sheikh is affiliated with al-Islâh (in the governorates of ‘Amrân and Hajjah
for instance). Nevertheless, this mobilization system proved fragile, and the party lost
many “tribal” districts during elections (in 1997, then in 2003), which led it to promote a
more autonomous strategy. Al-Islâh then created other electoral strongholds, which now
seem more enduring. Increased reliance on the party’s ideological message brought in
additional votes in Lower Yemen (al-Yaman al-Sufla), in the governorates of Ibb and Taiz,
as well as in major cities where tribal allegiances play only secondary roles and where
international observers help make elections more transparent than elsewhere. In 2003, al-
Islâh won 10 out of 19 MP seats in the capital Sanaa. 
29 The Yemeni Congregation for Reform has been successful  in rallying support beyond
tribal allegiances and expanding to commercial ventures and networks. In the southern
regions where tribal organization is less influential, emigration and economic success –
particularly in Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries – have produced family notabilities that
are all potential voters for al-Islâh’s. In the 2003 elections, ‘Abd al-Khâliq bin Shayhûn,
born into an important family of tradesmen settled in Saudi Arabia, was elected on al-
Islâh’s ballot in a district of the Yâfi‘ region (northeast of Aden).
30 Indeed,  businessmen are  often described as  al-Islâh’s  third  component.  They  provide
means and financing and grant the party privileged access to conservative elites. One
obvious  example  is  the  commercial  empire  of  the  al-Ahmar  family,  which  includes
printing presses, travel agencies, restaurants, transportation, etc. Hamîd al-Ahmar’s is
the owner of the Sabafon mobile telephone company which makes it possible to broadcast
different slogans (via SMSs sent to all users), especially in support of Palestine, or to call
for  boycotts  of  certain  items  (of  Danish  products  for  instance,  following  the  2006
controversy over the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad14) or non-Muslim holidays
(e.g.  Valentine’s  Day).  During  the  2006  presidential  election,  the  mobile  telephone
operator stopped short of calling directly for voting in favor of Faysal bin Shamlân, the
candidate sponsored by al-Islâh, but did convey information via SMS on meeting locations
and dates of the opposition’s campaign15. Likewise, Sabafon relayed in July 2008 the news
of the establishment of the Virtue Authority (Hayat al-fadhila), an individual initiative led
by religious scholars with close ties to the party, including ‘Abd al-Majîd al-Zindânî16.
Moreover, the conference establishing it was held at the Apollo Center, a complex owned
by the al-Ahmar family. 
31 This  privileged  access  to  means  of  mobilization  (through  allegedly  non-political
commercial companies) has made it possible for al-Islâh’s members or sympathizers to
network and create common references. Accordingly, even if non exclusive or systematic,
a contract signed with Sabafon rather than its competitors may sometimes be perceived
as a political act and a sign of allegiance to al-Islâh in particular, and also to the opposition
in  general.  While  other  companies,  especially  those  established  by  Hâ’il  Sa‘îd  (al-
Tadhâmun International  Islamic  Bank,  Abû  Walad  Biscuit  Factory)  apparently  do  not
supply direct financing to the party, they remain close to it and support its social base by
building mosques (especially in Aden in the mid-1990s) and buying advertising spots in
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various publications close to al-Islâh (al-Asima or al-Sahwa) or to Islamists in general (al-
Muntadâ). 
 
Community action
32 These “rental”  resources  are completed and most  probably reinvested in community
action through more direct mobilizations. From charities to mosques to schools, al-Islâh’s
wide  range  of  resources  and  repertoires,  resulting  from  its  members  fervor,  helps
strengthen the party’s influence and ensures its popularity and visibility on the Yemeni
political landscape. The party is actually surrounded by a cluster of actors performing in
various fields, including charity, education, mass media, religion and human rights. In
order to understand the scope of al-Islâh’s diverse, numerous mobilizing resources one
cannot ignore this large collection of social networks; they are not always coordinated or
even institutionalized, yet they create a team spirit and share a number of references and
objectives that define the political and ideological principles of the party. 
33 The Charitable  Society  for  Social  Welfare  (Jam‘iyya  lil-islâh  al-ijtima‘î  al-khayriyya)  also
known as al-Islâh charity, established in 1990, represents a major resource for the party
(Alviso-Marino, research to be published). Financed by traders, probably subsidized by
Gulf countries and funded by substantial individual donations17, the society is active in
charity  works  for  the  benefit  of  the  underprivileged  (poor  neighborhoods,  orphans,
handicapped people, areas hit by natural disasters, Somali refugee camp in Aden, etc.)
and is one of the best developed and most efficient in the country. Members of the society
and members of the political party all consistently deny any relation between the two
organizations.  However,  their  affiliations  are  inextricably  linked,  and  the  activities
sponsored by the charity are undeniably beneficial to the party (Clark, 2004; Phillips,
2008, p. 144)18.  Al-Islâh’s members, frequently involved in charity works (Grabundzija,
2003,  p.  129),  use  the  organization  network  as  a  reservoir  of  sympathizers  easily
mobilized  at  election  time19.  What’s  more,  charity  activities are  performed in  areas
conducive to protest because they lack state aid. Yet, the CSSW also has followers outside
the sphere of underprivileged people. 
34 By soliciting donations and organizing protests in support of Palestine, particularly those
coordinated  with  the  al-Quds  International  Institution  (mu’assasa  al-quds  al-dawliyya),
whose vice-chairman was ‘Abd Allâh al-Ahmar and whose actions and solicitations were
relayed by SMSs to Sabafon customers,  the Charitable Society for  Social  Welfare has
gained  support  from  the  masses  who  associate  such  mobilizations  with  the  party’s
dynamism. For instance, during the protests in support of Gaza in December 2008 and
January 2009, al-Islâh emerged – even in the opinion of a member of the Socialist Party –
as a “clearly active force” and a major mobilizing party whose activities were far more
significant than those organized by the General People’s Congress20. 
35 Education is another field of local action favored by al-Islâh, who – throughout history –
has  infiltrated  the  social  fabric  by  way  of  the  Scientific  Institutes  (ma‘ahid  ‘ilmiyya).
Established in the mid-1970s to counter the ideological offensive of the Socialist Party in
South Yemen border areas and initially financed by Saudi Arabia, the parapublic teaching
network offered religion-based education. The network was independently managed by
the  Direction  of  Scientific  Institutes  and  led  by  individuals  close  to  the  Muslim
Brotherhood - such as Yahyâ al-Fusayyil, who later became al-Islâh’s secretary general -
which helped spread the party’s ideals throughout the country and made the recruitment
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of new members easier (al-Saqqâf*, 2004). Placed under the government’s authority in
2002, the Institutes merged with the public education sector and were administratively
and financially integrated into the Ministry of Education, which caused an important
wave of protest among party members21. 
36 The al-Imân University is  another branch of  the education network where al-Islâh is
involved. Established in Sanaa in 1993 by al-Islâh Consultative Council member ‘Abd al-
Majîd al-Zindânî, the university, which hosted over 4,000 students in 2006, specializes in a
religious curriculum (Johnsen, 2006). Although it is officially independent and free from
government control, it is widely associated with the party and constitutes a reservoir for
rallying young people and religious elites in Yemen and abroad. 
37 The same holds true for the University of Science and Technology (Jâma‘at al-‘ulûm wa al-
tiknûlûjiyâ) in Sanaa and its various branches in all major cities. Established in 1994, it was
built on land donated by ‘Alî Muhsin, a public figure close to President Sâlih and the
military commander of the northern region, a land it shares with an important mosque
built  by  Sheikh  Sinân  Abû  Luhûm.  Although  the  university  curriculum,  generally
regarded as first-rate, is not religion-based and although the structure as a whole is not
affected by charges of support to terrorism formulated by the US government against al-
Imân and its president, al-Zindânî, the university is fully integrated into al-Islâh’s vast
network.  Al-Islâh’s  connections  with  major  tradesmen and figures  close  to  the  party
contribute  indirectly  to  the  university’s  good  reputation  and  profile.  Indeed,  the
University of Science and Technology Hospital, whose board of directors is chaired by
Târiq Sinân Abû Luhûm, is regarded as one of the best in the capital city, which helps
cement the university’s local roots and image of modernity and efficiency, in opposition
to the underdeveloped and difficulty-ridden public universities and hospitals22. 
38 Al-Islâh also relies on a large media network as another mobilization tool. A wide-ranging
press helps the party spread their views and take part in processing information. The
network includes al-Sahwa and al-Asima, two weekly newspapers affiliated with the party,
al-Masdar and  al-Nâs,  two  independent  weekly  publications  with  ties  to  the  Muslim
Brotherhood,  and  al-Nûr,  a  monthly  magazine previously  named  Nawâfidh.  These
publications expand the party’s presence within the social fabric by speaking on behalf of
the “Islâhî” cause and its variations. The politically-oriented press is supplemented by a
publishing network with partisan political and religious markers: printing presses (such
as al-Afâq, owned by the al-Ahmar family), and specialized bookshops and shops selling
religious DVDs and tapes (such as tasjîlât al-Imân) are all indirect mobilization tools used
by al-Islâh. 
39 Moreover, al-Islâh benefits from religious, institutional and informal structures that help
develop its local presence and influence. Friday sermons are perhaps the most obvious
mobilization tool, and their openly political orientation is a great asset for the party, all
the more so as the domination – even the control – of mosques and training institutes by
religious scholars close to the Muslim Brotherhood has been increasing in the South
(notably in Aden) since 1994 and in traditionally Zaydi areas since 200423.  Under the
supervision of al-Islâh members, Koran courses for children taught in the afternoon or
during the summer and literacy courses for women in rural regions, in addition to regular
participation in prayers at the mosque all help create social networks that are beneficial
to the party. This is particularly true in predominantly feminine circles. Indeed, political
socialization seems less easy for women (men are invited to take part in political debates
at a young age during qat sessions24) and is mainly done through social structures linked
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to  charity  action,  as  mentioned  earlier,  or  to  religious  teaching.  As  is  the  case  for
charitable  activities,  Koranic  societies  create  mobilization  networks.  For  instance,
women’s  religious  meetings  including  comments  on  the  Holy  Koran  and  debate  on
religious issues are not just a tool for the militant “re-Islamization” of society. According
to Janine Clark (2004), these nadwât (forums) are a way to bring together women more or
less in favor of the “Islâhî” cause, and introduce them to political ideas and encourage
partisan  commitment.  These  meetings  are  actually  an  efficient  mobilization  tool  to
infiltrate the social fabric as well as a recruitment channel. 
40 Finally,  the field of  Human Rights  provides  high visibility  to  the party,  even if  only
recently developed. Indeed, the activities of the non-governmental organization HOOD
(The National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms - al-Haya al-wataniyya lil-
difa‘  ‘an  al-huqûq wa al-huriyyât),  are  consistent  with al-Islâh’s  principles.  Mobilization
slogans focus primarily on Guantanamo Bay and the defense of Yemeni prisoners. Such
activities unite a large portion of the population around problems and issues that do not
affect the regime directly and are unanimously agreed upon. Yet the issue of arbitrary
arrests or disappearances, particularly those linked to the Saada War, is also discussed.
Although there is no direct link, public opinion generally associates these activities with
the party,  and is  familiar  with HOOD activists’  political  leanings,  especially  with the
positions of the organization’s founder, Muhammad Nâjî ‘Allâw, or attorney Khâlid al-
Anisî (who left the organization in 2009) or party members Ahmad ‘Amrân and ‘Abd al-
Rahmân Barmân.  The  same is  true  of  Women Journalists  without  Chains  (Munazama
sahafiyât bilâ quyûd), an association whose president, Tawakkul Karmân, is a member of al-
Islâh’s Consultative Council.  The affiliation undeniably brings the party many political
benefits. 
41 Taiz humorist Fahd al-Qarni uses another inventive mobilization method. His satire of the
ruling  power  spread  by  audio  tapes  was  immensely  successful  during  the  2006
presidential campaign. Since then, he has frequently participated in events organized by
al-Islâh and opposition parties. His caricatures of the president, of the General People’s
Congress and of  Prime Minister Bâ Jammal led to his arrest  in July 2006,  and to his
imprisonment for a few months. The incident helped the Islamist party boost their image
as defenders of freedom of expression and take control of the large solidarity network
formed around the artist, especially through the action of the HOOD organization25. 
42 al-Islâh obviously has no qualms about using all available means and tools to publicize its
doctrine and recruit sympathizers and activists26.  In terms of mobilization, the party
clearly benefits from varied resources that make up its solid local base and important
followers’ networks. 
43 As  a  result,  members  of  al-Islâh  are  just  as  likely  to  participate  in  strictly  political
activities as they are to be involved in socioeconomic or religious activities that are more
or less connected to the party. The reasons for loyalty between the various leanings and
the political parties are not always easy to identify; however, they do exist and provide an
explanation for “Islâhî” activism. The relationship between these “targeted” segments of
population (sympathizers, charity beneficiaries, readers, voters, etc.) and the party varies
according to circumstances that depend on their expectations as well as on the types of
capital and arguments used to mobilize them. 
44 In this respect, al-Islâh’s membership is complex, because it is based on diverse forms of
relationships  with  the  party  and  commitment  towards  different  objects  and  fields.
Nevertheless, these networks are inextricably linked because they represent solidarity
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and community networks with common religious beliefs. Therefore, social fabrics are not
unified,  but  rather bridged together by these common values that  ease mobility and
transfer from one field of action to another. If, as sources close to al-Islâh believe, the
party  constitutes  the  largest  partisan  structure  in  Yemen,  it  may  realistically  be
considered  as  a  popular  party,  if  not  as  a  mass  party.  Beyond  political  divisions,
recruitment is  based on religious references largely shared among the population.  In
addition to patronage and solidarity networks, the party’s support is founded on a social
and religious conservative position, which may be regarded by some as the “interpreter
of the Yemeni society’s culture27.” 
45 Besides a substantial base of activists, al-Islâh is privileged to have a national and local
organizational structure far more developed than its competitors (al-Yamani, 2003, p. 52).
Local  branches  add  dynamism  to  a  partisan  life  often  portrayed  as  elitist.  Strong
management provides coherence to these heterogeneous networks. Indeed, while al-Islâh 
is  made  up  of  different  groups  who  sometimes  hold  opposing  opinions,  its  internal
“pluralism” is offset by the influence of the party leaders, who seem to exert rigorous
control over party members. That’s why al-Islâh followers often boast about the richness
of their party, anchored in the variety of positions expressed within the party, and reject
the fact that such richness may be a source of internal divisions, since the decisions taken
by the General Secretariat or the Consultative Council are respected and supported by the
masses28.  In  fact,  despite  the  internal  diversity  of  the  party,  positions  are  generally
endorsed by all members, who are less inclined to publicly display their disagreements
than Socialist Party members for exemple. The authority emanating from the relatively
closed circle  of  the  party’s  political  elite  may be  explained by  “the  charisma of  the
leadership29” or by the existence of  an allegiance mechanism, whose functionality is
strengthened  by  the  fact  that  many  members  view  their  commitment  to  the  party
through a religious prism. 
 
The Difficult Process of Emancipation: Building an
Alternative Force 
46 Since  the  late  1990s,  al-Islâh’s  leadership  has  endorsed  a  strategy  of  alliance  and
cooperation  with  other  opposition  movements,  and  particularly  with  their  historic
enemy,  the  Yemeni  Socialist  Party  (Browers,  2007).  How do Islamists  negotiate  their
merger with the opposition? What are the consequences of relinquishing a system based
on  loyalty?  The  final  part  of  our  study  will  focus  on  the  realization  of  al-Islâh’s
emancipation potential, mentioned earlier. How are resources converted and mobilized
to re-create a concrete opposition project? 
 
The party from 1990 to 1997: between alliance and opposition 
47 Following the Yemeni unification in 1990, President Ali ‘Abd Allâh Sâlih was confronted
with socialist elites from the former South Yemen, who – even if destabilized – were to
rule the country with him in accordance with the unity agreement. In an effort to change
the balance of forces, Sâlih turned more overtly to al-Islâh and other Islamist groups,
including Salafis and other groups linked to the movement of Zaydi revival. By co-opting
them  in  place  and  stead  of  his  socialist  “partners”,  he  altered  the  boundaries  and
territories of the opposition. 
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48 Between 1993  and 1997,  the  Yemeni  government  was  composed  of  al-Islâh  ministers
representing the various leanings of the party. They held relatively important positions,
such as Education, Religious Affairs, Justice and one deputy prime minister. In October
1993, President Sâlih appointed ‘Abd al-Majîd al-Zindânî, who had been living in Saudi
Arabia for several years and was entrusted with Islamist mobilization in Afghanistan in
the 1980s, to the five-member Presidential Council. Al-Islâh was thus introduced in the
institution, whose task was to provide the president with assistance and which had been,
until  then,  composed  of  three  members  of  the  General  People’s  Congress  and  two
socialists. Moreover, the 1993 election of al-Islâh chairman ‘Abd Allâh al-Ahmar to the
office of Parliament Speaker was carried by the votes of the ruling party. The cooperation
between the ruling power and al-Islâh reached a climax in 1994 during the brief war
between the armies and political elites of the two former Yemeni entities. Paradoxically,
the war was also to help speed up its decline. 
49 Al-Islâh Islamists provided theological legitimization for the war and took part in combat
operations  with armed militias  trained for  this  purpose  by  tribal  factions  and other
militants recently returned from Afghanistan. During the fighting, al-Islâh member ‘Abd
al-Wahhâb al-Daylamî, who was later appointed minister of Justice immediately after the
war, issued a fatwa equating secessionists with impious individuals (Schwedler, 2004, p.
217).  The  president  benefited  from his  partnership  with  al-Islâh  during  the  struggle
between northern and southern elites for political hegemony in unified Yemen. However
the partnership was no longer of use when the North achieved military supremacy over
the South and the Yemeni Socialist Party, brought down to its knees, was compelled to
rebuild itself around individuals who had rejected secession. The alliance game of the
General  People’s  Congress  changed with the quasi-total  disappearance of  its  socialist
rival.  Although  al-Islâh  was  granted  nine  ministerial  portfolios  in  October  1994,  the
Islamists’ influence was progressively limited, while the authority of the General People’s
Congress increased. Al-Islâh was gradually excluded from decision-making circles, even
though the elites of both parties maintained a close relationship. 
50 The  first  visible,  albeit  incomplete,  split  occurred  in  1997.  In  keeping  with  their
ambiguous position vis-à-vis the ruling power, the party leadership signed a declaration
of cooperation with the Higher Coordination Council for the Opposition30 in August 1996,
and a vast majority of its MPs boycotted the 1997 budget vote. However, they were not
quite  ready  to  relinquish  their  alliance  with  the  General  People’s  Congress.  They
published a statement in October of the same year, to emphasize their wish to maintain a
strong relationship with the ruling party (Schwedler,  2004, p.  221).  On April  27,  1997
however, the parties were unable to reach an electoral agreement, which resulted in GPC
candidates  running  against  al-Islâh’s,  in  addition  to  several  candidates  from  minor
parties.  al-Islâh emerged as  the  new –  and almost  unique –  opposition party,  in  the
absence of socialists who boycotted the elections; they won 22% of the votes, but lost 10
seats  compared  to  1993,  while  the  General  People’s  Congress  gained  60  extra  seats,
dominating parliament by a wide margin31. Following the relative defeat in the elections,
probably aggravated by various voting irregularities, al-Islâh was also excluded from the
government, as no portfolio was granted to the party members in the new cabinet. The
role of political backup, once held by al-Islâh, was then briefly played by the small Zaydi
al-Haqq  Party,  whose  Secretary  General  Ahmad  al-Shâmî  was  appointed  Minister  of
Endowments.  The  co-optation  of  a  firm  opponent  to  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  was
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implicitly  aimed at  undermining the  party’s  position among religious  or  educational
institutions, particularly the famous Scientific Institutes (ma‘ahid ‘ilmiyya). 
51 Yet, the break between al-Islâh and the ruling power in 1997 was not quite clear: The
threats  of  boycotting  the  legislative  elections,  waged  by  some al-Islâh  figures  in  the
partisan press, were never carried out. The party never used the name of the president in
their statements and criticism, however virulent. Furthermore, ‘Abd Allâh al-Ahmar was
reelected as parliament speaker with the support of General People’s Congress MPs. It
seems that a head-on confrontation with the ruling power of Ali ‘Abd Allâh Sâlih was the
red line that al-Islâh was ultimately unable – or simply unwilling – to cross during the
1990s.  Therefore,  the  party  did  not  enter  any  candidate  for  the  1999  presidential
elections. Najîb Qahtân al-Sha‘bî, a member of the GPC, ran against President Sâlih in an
attempt to give a touch of credibility to an election where the incumbent president won
with more than 96% of the vote (Wedeen, 2008). 
 
Progressive rallying to the opposition platform
52 As the party leaders  began to explore the possibility  of  cooperation with opposition
parties, particularly with socialists, al-Islâh’s change in strategy occurred progressively
when their political situation evolved: agreements were found when al-Islâh was excluded
from political decision-making circles. The party’s survival and credibility were at stake
when they joined the opposition platform. Yet, the shift in allegiance and the internal
reform made it possible for the party to remain “in the game.” Does this reveal a surge in
pragmatism among Islamists? The answer is yes, insofar as efforts are made to forego
historical ideological rivalries between Islamists and socialists to the benefit of these new
forms of  cooperation.  We cannot ignore,  however,  that while a partnership with the
General People’s Congress seemed rather “natural”,  it  was also primarily tactical  and
dependent on the leaders’ personal interrelations. 
53 Al-Islâh’s opposition strategy emerged at the same time as the process of cooperation
among opposition parties led by the Yemeni Socialist Party. The latter, in an effort to
restructure itself around reformist figures such as Jâr Allâh ‘Umar 32, chose to renew a
dialogue with the ruling elites and return to the political arena after the 1997 boycott.
The socialists, who had worked since 1995 at bringing together opposition parties into a
Higher  Coordination  Council  for  the  Opposition,  reached  out  to  al-Islâh’s.  Numerous
contacts were made and forums were organized, such as the Political Development Forum
(muntadâ al-tanmiya al-siyâsiyya) led by ‘Alî Sayf Hasan, with the participation of reformist
elites  from both parties;  as  a  result  a  common platform was institutionalized.  These
bridge-building efforts revealed the increasingly pressing need for opposition parties to
develop long-lasting mechanisms of  cooperation against  the backdrop of  a  shrinking
political stage (Burgat, 2000). 
54 During the 2001 local elections and referendum, al-Islâh was all the more committed to
the  opposition’s  campaign  as  the  General  People’s  Congress  criticized  and  publicly
accused the party of “electoral terrorism.” (Browers, 2007, p.  570).  Opposition parties
reached agreements among themselves in an attempt to secure a maximum number of
seats in local councils and fight against a number of constitutional amendments. The
campaign failed, amendments were ratified by referendum with close to 75% of the votes,
and the General People’s Congress prevailed in local councils. The defeat was as much the
result of a lack of transparency in the elections and probable ballot-rigging as it was the
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result of a poorly coordinated ineffective opposition campaign. Nevertheless, the episode
was an important step in the bridge building process between al-Islâh and the leftwing
and the validation of the party’s new role amid the opposition. al-Islâh denounced the
fraud and insecurity - violent clashes marred the campaign and the voting process - and
for some time refused to acknowledge the results published by the government33.
55 The post-9/11 era gave al-Islâh members the opportunity to consolidate their opposition
strategy.  While  Yemen  was  heavily  criticized  by  the  international  community  and
accused of providing a safe haven for groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, President Sâlih took
a stand in the war against terrorism, and confronted al-Islâh with a security-oriented
position.  A victim of  this  criminalization process,  al-Islâh  leadership,  particularly  the
more Islamist oriented wing, intensified their efforts to build up the opposition platform
and took part in the establishment of the Joint Meeting Parties (Ahzab al-liqâ’ al-mushtarak
). The Meeting, whose successful breakthrough on the political stage only materialized in
2005, took part for the first time in the 2003 legislative elections. Agreements were then
reached between al-Islâh and the Yemeni Socialist Party in more than half of all electoral
districts in an effort to avoid fragmenting anti-government votes (Schwedler and Clark,
2006; Carapico, 2003). 
56 In November 2005, the opposition was further unified by the publication of the “Unified
project plan for a comprehensive national and political reform” by the Joint Meeting. The
program, which set the political agenda of the unified opposition, was cosigned by al-Islâh
, the Yemeni Socialist Party, the Nasserite Popular Unionist Organization, the National
Arab Socialist  Baath Party,  al-Haqq Party and the Union of  Popular Forces (two small
parties with Zaydi referents). Parties of the Joint Meeting agreed on supporting a single
presidential  candidate for the 2006 election and organized the opposition’s first  ever
presidential campaign. The joint platform was then created, in spite of the reluctance of
some members (some even regarded an alliance with “atheist” socialists as treason and
opposed the platform).  The unified opposition supported the candidacy of  Faysal  bin
Shamlân, a former Oil Minister and an independent public figure, despite his southern
roots  indirectly  associated  with  socialists.  Al-Islâh Islamists  saw  in  Shamlân  the
opportunity to end the conflict that riddled the Joint Meeting leadership at the time.
While his  integrity and honesty most  likely appealed to the opposition regardless  of
individual party political principles, the candidate’s position was identified by al-Islâh as
close  to  the  Muslim  Brotherhood.  Indeed,  Shamlân  had  participated  in  1990  in  the
establishment of the Yemeni Free Platform (al-Minbar al-yamanî al-hurr), considered as
the counterpart of the Muslim Brotherhood in the South, before returning to the political
stage as an independent figure. Regardless of the lock that guaranteed reelection of Sâlih,
Shamlân’s relative success (22% of votes) gave the opposition new prospects. Al-Islâh had
invested a great deal in the campaign (more than any other party of the Joint Meeting),
and  made  their  political  resources  available  to  the  coalition  (mobilization  networks,
press,  experience,  etc.)  (Poirier,  2008).  Al-Islâh publications 34 were  now  primarily
dedicated to the program of the Joint Meeting, a complete change in the party’s political
identity. The party was frequently criticized by reluctant members, who considered that
al-Islâh no longer supported their own political program, but rather the general program
of the Joint Meeting35. 
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Al-Islâh’s identity repositioning
57 Al-Islâh’s commitment to the Joint Meeting made it necessary to put aside some forms of
embedded sectarianism, and give up stereotyped visions of  socialists  and,  to a lesser
extent, of Zaydis as well. As we mentioned earlier, al-Islâh’s political program had long
been  fueled  by  the  split  between  Islamists  and  socialists.  This  stigmatization,
demonstrated by discriminatory positions, was for some time less symbolic and became
very direct in the early 1990s. The Yemeni Observatory for Human Rights, whose close
ties with the leftwing were no secret, reported no less than 155 assassinations of socialist
figures  by  religious  and  paramilitary  organizations,  mostly  between  1990  and  1994
(Rougier, 1999). A large majority among Islamists condemned these acts of violence, but
they continued to be perpetrated as evidenced by the December 2002 assassination of Jâr
Allâh ‘Umar, then deputy secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party, during al-Islâh 
General  Congress  he  was  attending  as  a  guest36.  The Islamist  party  was  therefore
compelled to give up their allegation that socialists,  because of their secular political
leanings,  were “unbelievers” working for  the West  and importing western “impious”
practices37.  It  became  necessary  to  put  an  end  to  religious  discrimination  against
socialists and call attention to the piousness of some, such as Jâr Allâh ‘Umar, and – more
generally – to give up a strictly “Islamic” position and focus on socioeconomic criticism.
Along  these  lines,  Yemeni  Socialist  Party  leader  ‘Alî  al-Sararî  emphasized  “al-Islâh’s
important role in putting an end to propaganda against socialists38.” Vis-à-vis the Zaydi
partisans of al-Haqq Party or the Union of Popular Forces, al-Islâh gave up their claim that
the latter were regarded as enemies of the Republic seeking to re-establish the Imamate
overthrown by the 1962 revolution. 
58 The change in al-Islâh’s strategy following their involvement in the opposition platform
clearly included a trend reversal from techniques of stigmatization to the promotion of
common references. It hasn’t been easy, however, to give up sectarian reflexes, especially
in the context of social unrest in the South since 2007 and the Saada War since 2004.
Indeed, stigmatizing attitudes, encouraged and fueled by the ruling power, may actually
be relevant again. In the South, the Retired Military Movement, which expanded beyond
the boundaries of the socio-professional group led to a resurgence of regionalism and
even to secessionist positions among a more radical faction (Mermier, 2008). Since 2007,
southern identity, in general, and the concept of national unity have been the subject of
many debates actively attended by al-Islâh. Muhsin Bâ Sura, al-Islâh’s leader in the former
South Yemen province of Hadramout, expressed the population’s mounting antagonism
towards unity and threatened to support secession if necessary reforms were not put in
place39.  In 2004,  the army launched the Saada War against  al-Hûthî  members of  the
Believing Youth (accused of paving the way for the reinstatement of the Imamate with
the support of the Shiite regime in Iran), which led to renewed attacks against Zaydis,
especially Hashemites;  such attacks have expanded to a large portion of the political
landscape, including some intellectuals close to al-Islâh (Dorlian, 2008). 
59 Moreover,  al-Islâh profoundly  reshaped  their  political  image  nationally  and
internationally by promoting a moderate, reformist elite. The movement, led by political
intellectuals close to the Muslim Brotherhood, distanced itself from ideology in favor of
pragmatism or,  at least,  from a direction based on ideological differences in favor of
practical  interests.  Muhammad  al-Yadûmî,  ‘Abd  al-Wahhâb  al-Anisî  and  Muhammad
Qahtân were the outstanding “asâtidh” (teachers) of this movement (Browers, 2007, p.
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575). Muhammad al-Yadûmî, a former member of the security services and a former al-
Islâh secretary general, has been the chairman of the party since the death of Sheikh ‘Abd
Allâh al-Ahmar in December 2007. Former Deputy Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Wahhâb al-Anisî
was the party’s secretary general, while Muhammad Qahtân was one of the ten members
of al-Islâh’s Higher Committee (al-Hay’at al-‘uliyya). The three public figures, who united
their efforts in the dialogue with the Yemeni Socialist Party and acted in favor of a joint
action by opposition parties, played a major role in the establishment and consolidation
of the Joint Meeting. While maintaining a conservative branch, al-Islâh has used the press,
among other tools, to launch onto the political scene young actors such as Sa’îd Shamsân,
Ibrahîm  al-Ha’ir,  Muhammad  ‘Abd  al-Salâm or  Sa‘îd  Thâbit,  with  liberal  ambitions,
modernist policies and a commitment to the “democratic” partisan system. These young
men have joined the ranks of al-Islâh’s reformist wing40.
60 While they may not represent the opinion of the majority, these individuals have become
the  party’s  spokespersons  during  gatherings  and  protests  of  opposition  parties  or
international conferences. Furthermore, they have managed to soften some of the party’s
positions, especially with regard to women’s participation in political life. Although al-
Islâh refused to nominate female candidates for the elections, the debate on the role of
women in politics upset the status quo among party members and leaders, even if no
clear position was taken on the issue. The debate led to a slow promotion of women:
indeed 13 of them, approximately 10% of elected representatives, joined the Consultative
Council following the 2007 Congress. During the opening session held in the presence of
many independent journalists and observers, Tawakkul Karmân, a young female activist,
delivered a speech directly supporting the Joint Meeting process. 
61 With  the  emergence  of  new  elites,  the  party  opened  up  to  the  international  scene
particularly  through ties  maintained with  the  National  Democratic  Institute  and the
National  Endowment for Democracy which provide respectability and new sources of
political  support  to  the  party.  In  an  effort  to  strengthen  their  position  amid  their
international networks, al-Islâh has been forced to redefine their ideas and projects in
order  to  comply  with  the  agendas  imposed by  some organizations.  Consequently,  in
addition to promoting the development of reformist elites, al-Islâh has launched a full-
fledged communication campaign in an attempt to emerge as a centrist party committed
to democracy and to a moderate Islamic project. This position, associated with the new
constraints of the international arena, has also led the party to take a more active part in
the opposition. 
 
Should the active participation in the opposition lead to alternation?
62 In this context of reshaping their political allegiances and partisan identity, what role can
al-Islâh play as an opposition party within the Joint Meeting? We shall now examine the
evolution of the tactics adopted by the opposition coalition, which seem to have switched
from dialogue to boycott, as well as the ambivalent positions taken by the party. 
63 So far, the Joint Meeting’s strategy has been based on their participation in the instituted
political  game.  During  the  2006  presidential  elections,  the  coalition  thus  rose  to
prominence as the legitimate opposition.  The new configuration directly affected the
customary lack of electoral transparency and forced the General People’s Congress to
review their  electoral  practices  and political  platform41.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the
president was forced to make many concessions to his rival by using the same campaign
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themes as the opposition, such as fight against poverty, unemployment and corruption,
education reforms and improvement of public services. 
64 The Joint Meeting’s credibility as an opposition force to the ruling power was confirmed
when they were included as a GPC’s “partner” in the reform of the electoral law and the
Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum (al-Lajna al-‘uliyya lil-intikhâbât wa al-
istiftâ’), an institution created in 2001 to organize and monitor the elections. While GPC
and Joint  Meeting representatives agreed on the need for these reforms,  the stormy
debates and incompatible positions defended by the parties led to intense battles of wills
during  the  autumn  of  200842;  the  Joint  Meeting  refused  to  attend  a  number  of
parliamentary sessions and threatened to boycott the parliamentary elections scheduled
to take place on 27 April 2009. The Joint Meeting gambled on the support (and pressure)
of  foreign institutions and defended the transition from a First  Past  The Post voting
system in single electoral districts to a party-list proportional voting system in multiple
districts43.  An  agreement  was  finally  reached  in  February  2009  following  major
negotiations between the General People’s Congress and the Joint Meeting Parties: The
elections were postponed until 2011 and extensive reforms were promised in order to
introduce the party-list proportional system44. 
65 Although al-Islâh was officially involved in the process of establishing the opposition, they
seemed willing to let their partners appear in the spotlight, notably Yassîn Sa‘îd Nu‘mân,
secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party, featured many times in the partisan and
independent press. Al-Islâh members took a rather reserved stance on events that were
wreaking havoc in the country (terrorism,  economic crisis,  challenges to the North’s
hegemony over  the  South,  the  Saada  War).  The  contrast  was  striking  between their
discreet mobilization on the Southern issue on the one hand – especially in light of the
repressive steps taken by the government,  the release of political  prisoners -,  or the
Saada War and its consequences, and, on the other hand, the efforts they made to boost
the boycott  campaign of  Danish products or the support  for Gaza45.  This  attitude of
taking a back seat to their partners, no matter how little representative they may be, is
undoubtedly a legacy of the 1990s and shows how difficult it is for al-Islâh to achieve
emancipation46. The talks about amendments to the constitution and the electoral law,
and the forthcoming parliamentary elections are expected to be an interesting challenge
to the strategy of head-on opposition and alliance, officially embraced by the party. 
66 In addition to their  cautious behavior,  al-Islâh is  divided by contrasting ambitions.  A
significant number of party members are not really willing to get involved in electoral
battles and undermine their alliance with the ruling power. Refusal to break away from
allegiance to the president also has affected and weakened the unitary movement begun
by the party in 2006.  For example,  on the eve of  the presidential  elections,  al-Islâh’s
chairman ‘Abd Allâh al-Ahmar declared his personal allegiance to President Sâlih which
delegitimized Faysal bin Shamlan the party’s candidate (al-Shuja’*, 2007). Many sheikhs
of  the  Hâshid  tribal  confederation  then  followed  suit  and  supported  the  incumbent
president. On the whole, traditional affiliations and personal allegiances have endured
and to some extent undermined the party’s efforts to establish its autonomy. A branch of
al-Islâh still rejects political games for the sake of preserving consensus and protecting
themselves from government repression at the same time. For example, ‘Abd al-Majîd al-
Zindânî has not overtly supported his party’s shift to the opposition. He refrained from
making  any  public  declaration  of  allegiance  in  2006  and  remained  silent  about  the
opposition-backed candidate; as the chairman, he hosted the president’s visits to al-Imân
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university at the beginning and near the end of his electoral campaign. Competition has
also come from groups that favor an apolitical approach, particularly the Salafi movement
(al-Hikma in particular). 
67 Despite profound changes, al-Islâh leadership does not seem willing to break free from
their  former  loyalty  to  the  power  in  place  and do  without  their  “rental”  resources.
Therefore, the reformist wing could just be a showcase of their commitment amid the
Joint Meeting and coexist with more conservative movements. When the party chairman,
Sheikh ‘Abd Allâh al-Ahmar, who symbolized the historic alliance with President Sâlih,
died in December 2007, the party had a major opportunity for emancipation. However, al-
Ahmar’s death did not lead to any significant break. Al-Islâh MP Hamîd al-Ahmar, in spite
of his strong anti-establishment position and support of Faysal bin Shamlân during the
2006 electoral  campaign,  later  seemed to  hesitate  between recanting his  position by
adopting a more conciliatory attitude,  and calling for  new presidential  elections and
advising president Sâlih to step down, as he did during an interview on al-Jazeera in
August 2009. His brothers, Sâdiq and Husayn, himself a member of the General People’s
Congress,  stood  by  ‘Abd  al-Majîd  al-Zindânî  when  he  created  the  Vice  and  Virtue
Committee (hayat al-fadhila), a sort of religious vice squad, in July 2008. Such positioning
was considered by some analysts as part of a renewed alliance between the ruling power
and al-Ahmar’s sons47. 
68 Indeed, ideological concessions and outward pragmatism do not have unanimous support
among party leaders or members (al-Daghshî*, to be published)48. Changing affiliations
and rhetoric and partnership with the Yemeni Socialist Party have led to various clashes
about the way many partisans view the “Islâhî cause” even if the party’s predominant
public position is openly in favor of the Joint Meeting. The rhetoric of stigmatization of
socialists  or  Zaydis  and  the  opposition  to  al-Islâh’s  new  trend  remain  a  reality  and
continues to reflect the party’s internal diversity. 
 
Conclusion
69 The  issue  of  al-Islâh’s  moderation  and  its  relation  to  the  party’s  participation  in
government were the subject of an important research by Jillian Schwedler (2007). Based
on  a  comparative  study  with  the  Jordanian  Islamic  Action  Front,  Schwedler’s  work
focuses on the complicated process of opening up and breaking away from radicalism.
The author concludes that al-Islâh’s participation in the government between 1993 and
1997 and their close ties with the country’s ruling elites have had little effect in terms of
moderation,  defined  as  the  capacity  to  accept  multiple  perspectives.  Yet  al-Islâh’s
commitment  to  the  Joint  Meeting,  largely  described throughout  our  study,  seems to
challenge Schwedler’s theory. Indeed, the quest for autonomy, though difficult, is now
generally accepted by the party leadership. It involves more radical criticism of the ruling
power on themes of corruption or authoritarianism, and a capacity to cooperate with
various political groups, primarily with socialists. 
70 Since its creation in 1990, al-Islâh has shown a remarkable capacity to adapt, by striking
alliances with the ruling power in some cases while successfully preserving its position as
an opposition party. This ambivalent strategy made it possible for the party to be spared
both  by  repression  and  marginalization.  The  party’s  numerous  resources,  whether
“rental” or the result of efficient local action, are a real asset for mobilization. Taking
advantage of these resources to create an alternation project remains a hypothetical and
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fragile process still far from completion. Changes in alliances, constant transitions from
co-optation to emancipation, from consensus to criticism, all al-Islâh’s trademarks, make
the study of this highly rich and complex party both interesting and inspiring to study
this highly rich and complex party.
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NOTES
1.  In addition to the works referenced further in this chapter, several monographs of al-Islâh
were  published.  For  instance,  see  al-Tawîl*,  2009;  Al-Hakîmî*,  2003;  Grosgurin,  1994; Jillian
Schwedler,  1998;  Stiftl,  1999;  Sa‘id*,  1998;  Al-Saqqâf*,  1997;  Proceedings  of  the  seminar  “Al-
islâmiyûn fî al-sulta wa al-mu‘ârada” [Islamists in Power and within the Opposition] (in Arabic),
Shu’ûn al-‘asr, n°4, 1999, p. 35-186 and Proceedings of the seminar “Al-usûliyyât al-dîniyya wa hiwâr
al-hadhârât”[Religious Fundamentalists and the Dialogue of Civilizations], Tome 2: Al-islâmiyûn fî
al-Yaman[The Islamists in Yemen] (in Arabic), Sanaa, al-Markaz al-‘âm lî al-dirâsât wa al-buhûth wa
al-isdâr, 2002, 384 p.
2.   Such close ties are not without consequence. The mobility of major Islamist figures and their
presence in Saudi Arabia, where they studied, worked or found refuge, resulted, according to
some of their opponents, in a form of “Wahhabization of the Muslim Brotherhood”. ‘Abd Allâh
Hâshim al-Sayânî,  a  Yemeni Zaydi intellectual,  observed that adaptation to the specific  Saudi
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context had an influence, for example, on the positions of the Yemeni branch of the Muslim
Brotherhood (some of their leaders, such as ‘Abd al-Majîd al-Zindânî and Muhammad al-Yadûmî,
had lived in Saudi Arabia for long periods of time) on women’s rights and political participation.
According to al-Sayânî* (2002), the close ties with Saudi Arabia explain why Yemeni positions on
these issues are more conservative than those professed, for example, in Egypt or Lebanon.
3.   For further information on this key figure of contemporary Yemen, refer to his biography: Al-
Hadramî*, 1998; as well as his autobiography, published a few weeks before his death: Al-Ahmar*,
2007.
4.   Interview with an al-Islâh intellectual, Sanaa, February 25, 2008. 
5.   Even though al-Islâhwon more seats than the Yemeni Socialist Party (63 seats to 56), it still
had fewer votes in its favor than its competitor (17% compared to 18.5%). 
6.   In  spite  of  this  strong  aversion  for  the  concept  of  party,  various  formations  that  were
established in the early 1990s used the name “party”, particularly the al-Haqq Party, which was
established by the partisans of the Zaydi revival.
7.   ‘Abd al-Majîd al-Zindânî, Al-Hizbiyya [Partisanship] (in Arabic), recorded conference, undated.
8.   Interview with a member of al-Islâh’s Consultative Council, January 10, 2009. 
9.   Quoted by Lefresne, 1993.
10.   Even though he is a member of the so-called radical branch of the Muslim Brotherhood as
well as a prominent figure of al-Islâh, ‘Abd al-Majîd al-Zindânî, who was accused by the United
States of  having close relations with Usâma bin Laden,  seems to have escaped repression by
edging  closer  to  President  Sâlih.  On  ‘Abd  al-Majîd  al-Zindânî’s  position  vis-a-vis  these
accusations, see: al-Sharq al-Awsat, n°10069, June 23, 2006. 
11.  As an example, refer to the recorded sermon of Muhammad al-Anisî, titled al-Wahda[Unity]
(in Arabic), in the early 1990s, in which this member of al-Islâh(and secretary-general of al-Imân
University)  challenged directly  the  terms of  unity  with  the  socialists.  In  another  tape  made
public a few years later under the title Tâmur ilâ al-ta‘lîm fî al-Yaman [Plot against Teaching in Yemen
] (in Arabic), al-Anisî launched a particularly virulent attack on the government’s educational
policy for neglecting Islamic teaching. 
12.   In early 2008, the inhabitants of a town in the region of al-‘Ansiyyin, near the city of Ibb,
were  evicted  from their  village  by  Muhammad Ahmad al-Mansûr,  a  local  sheikh who was  a
member of the Consultative Council  (majlis  al-shûrâ)  known to be close to the president.  The
inhabitants  received  active  support  from  al-Islâh, especially  through  the  human  rights
organization HOOD. Al-Shâr‘a, n°39, March 15, 2008 or electronic version of the al-Islâh-affiliated 
Sahwa  net,  March  26,  2008:  http://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/view_news.asp?
sub_no=1_2008_03_26_62340 (retrieved on February 5,  2009). See also HOOD’s website:  http://
www.hoodonline.org/det.php?sid=2005 (retrieved on February 5, 2009).
13.   Or “pluralized authoritarianism”; refer to Phillips, 2008.
14.   SMS received by Sabafon customers on February 20, 2008: “Yemeni religious scholars call for
boycotting Danish products due to the drawings insulting the Prophet.” 
15.   Interview of the person in charge of the media campaign for the Joint Meeting during the
2006 elections on February 19, 2009: “We did not take advantage of it. We paid for sending the
SMSs about the opposition gatherings.  Sabafon was the only company who accepted to send
them, all others refused.” 
16.   On the Virtue Authority, see Anahi Alviso-Marino, research to be published.
17.   Charitable Society for Social Welfare, Orientation Profile (list of donors), leaflet of the Charitable
Society  for  Social  Welfare,  Sanaa,  undated.  See  also  the  society’s  website:  http://
www.csswyemen.org/. 
18.   Interview with a university professor close to al-Islâh, February 19, 2009.
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19.   « The role of charities in Yemen’s development », Yemen Times,  September 27 – 30, 2007:
http://www.yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=1089&p=business&a=1 (retrieved  on  February  19,
2009).
20.  Interview with a Yemeni Socialist Party leader, February 19, 2009. 
21.   “Al-Islâhyudîn al-ijrâ’ât al-hukûmiyya dhid al-Ma‘âhid” [Al-Islâhdenounces the government’s
measures against the Institutes] (in Arabic), Al-Sahwa, May 17, 2001.
22.   See  the  hospital’s  website  ( http://usthyemen.com/)  and  the  university  website  (
www.ust.edu.ye).
23.   On this issue,  refer to “Al-shatât al-Ta‘lîmî” (The Educational  Confusion) [in Arabic],  Al-
Thawra, April 7, 2005. 
24.   Qat is  a light narcotic chewed daily and in groups by a large proportion of the Yemeni
population during the maqyal. Qat is chewed fresh; its use has spread across the country thanks
to the development of road infrastructure, and has become an important element of the Yemeni
national identity. 
25.   Sahwa  net,  April  13,  2008:  http://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/view_news.asp?
sub_no=1_2008_04_13_62735 (retrieved on February 5, 2009). 
26.   Interview with a university professor close to al-Islâh, op. cit. 
27.   Idem.
28.   Interview with an al-Islâhmember, February 11, 2009. 
29.   Interview with a university professor close to al-Islâh, op. cit. 
30.   The Higher Coordination Council for the Opposition (al-Majlis al-a‘lâ li-l-tansîq) encompasses
the  Yemeni  Socialist  Party,  the  National  Arab  Socialist  Baath  Party  (Hizb  al-Ba‘th  al-‘arabî  al-
ishtiâakî al-qawmî), the League of the Sons of Yemen (leftist liberals,,Hizb Râbita Ibnâ’ al-Yaman),
the Nasserite Popular Unionist Organization (Tanzîm al-wahdawî al-sha‘âbî al-nâsirî), the Yemeni
Unionist  Congregation  (lay  leftist  movement,  Tajammu‘  al-wahdawi  al-yamanî),  the  Union  of
Popular Forces (liberal Zaydi party, Itihad al-Quwa al-Sha‘abiyya), the al-HaqqParty (conservative
Zaydi party) and the Constitutional Liberals’ Party (liberals close to the Yemeni Socialist Party,
Hizb al-Ahrâr al-Dusturî). 
31.   Al-Islâhretained 53 parliamentary seats (more than 17% of MPs), while the GPC dominated
the  Lower  Chamber  with  189  seats  out  of  301  (more  than  60%)  compared  to  54  seats for
independent candidates. 
32.   On the role played by this individual, see: Carapico, Wedeen, Wuerth, 2002.
33.   “Al-Islâh yudîn muhâwalât al-iltifâf ‘alâ al-natâ’ij” [Al-Islah denounces the attempts to rig
the results ] (in Arabic), al-Sahwa, February 22, 2001. Interview of Abdullah al-Ahmar, al-Sahwa,
May 24, 2001: “Mâ hadatha fî al-intikhâbât al-mahaliyya yusî’ lîal-dîmuqrâtiyya” (What Happened
in  the  Local  Elections  is  Harmful  to  Democracy)  [in  Arabic].  Report  of  the  French  Senate,
« Yémen:  l’Arabie  heureuse  en  mouvement »,  2002:  http://www.senat.fr/ga/ga35/ga35.html
(retrieved on February 5, 2009).
34.   For instance, Mansûr, 2007.
35.   Interview with a university professor close to al-Islâh, op. cit. 
36.   This political  assassination, perpetrated by an Islamist activist,  led to many rumors and
controversies and was perceived by some members of al-Islâhas an attempt sponsored by the
security services at undermining the rapprochement between the Islamists and the leftwing see
Yahyâ, 2003.
37.   On  the  stigmatization  of  socialism  by  the  Islamist,  and  more  particularly  the  Salafist,
movement, see: al-Wâdi‘î*, no date.
38.   Interview with Ali al-Sarari, February 19, 2009.
39.   Al-Masdar, n°4, December 4, 2007.
40.   On the new generation of  party members,  see also:  « Al-Islâhiyyûn al-judud »  (The new
reformists) [in Arabic], Abwâb, August 2008, p. 32-35.
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41.   M.  Poirier,  “Score  one  for  the  opposition?”,  Arab  Reform  Bulletin,  March  2009.
www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/ (retrieved on March 20, 2009). 
42.   Al-Sahwa,  n°1103,  November  22,  2007:  http://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/view_nnews.asp?
sub_no=408_2007_01_27_54232 (retrieved on February 5, 2009).
43.   The  members  of  the  Joint  Meeting  rallied  around  the  project  of  reviewing  electoral
districting  and  the  methods  of  electoral  registration  and  agreed  to  the  proportional  voting
system, but  the coalition was divided over promoting women’s  participation in political  life.
While the socialists heralded the idea of a quota for women (whether directly in parliament or on
electoral ballots), al-Islâhpartisans proved reluctant on the issue.
44.   M.  Poirier,  2009.  Newsyemen,  February  25,  2009:  http://www.newsyemen.net/
view_news.asp?sub_no=2_2009_02_25_25944 (retrieved on February 25, 2009). 
45.   Interview with an official  representative  of  the Sisters  Arab Forum for  Human Rights  (
Muntadâ al-shaqâ'iq al-‘arabî), Sanaa, January 20, 2009. 
46.   Sarah Phillips (2008, p.  163-166) described this attitude as “standing under the tree and
waiting for the fruit to fall.” 
47.   Yemen Times, n°1144, April 5, 2008. 
48.   “Shaykh salafî yukaffir al-Sahwa wa al-Nâss” [A Salafist Sheikh accuses Al-Sahwa’ and Al-Nâss
’ of Infidelity] (in Arabic), al-Tajammu‘, March 26, 2007. 
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